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it difficult to compare them with the original. The passages which I have taken the time to hunt up are rendered with reasonable accuracy, though not always in pleasing English.

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SOME RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY

Professor Santayana's first two volumes¹ in his proposed series of five will arouse wide interest. The remaining volumes² are entitled *Reason in Religion*, *Reason in Art*, *Reason in Science*. As the titles indicate, the author aims at presenting a broad-minded constructive synthesis of the main results reached through the free investigation of the nature and implications of human experience. Science, Art, Ethics, Religion are, in turn, called upon to contribute data. These data (as the title, "Reason," indicates) are woven together into a consistent fabric, in whose variegated pattern may be traced a unity of design and treatment. Professor Santayana's problem is to spell out clearly for the individual mind its own characteristics and meaning, as these have been determined by the larger processes of humanity, of whose activities the individual mind is but the passing embodiment. His method is that of observing and analyzing life in its objective forms, taking as his instructors all those who in times past have labored upon the same problems, but correcting and supplementing each by his own observations and keen analyses. His field, therefore, is as broad as human life, measured to the confines of barbarism, on the one hand, and of the highest forms of civilization, on the other. With sympathetic but clear-minded insight he endeavors to interpret life through itself. His motive is to be found in the desire to formulate an intelligent ideal of conduct—for to Professor Santayana the life of reason is as truly practical as reflective. Its conquests are never made in the interest of barren abstractions but always as the means of formulating the conditions of more fruitful and noble forms of living. Such a task, intelligently confronted, might well seem impossible of achievement in any but the most crass and superficial manner. Of this, Professor Santayana is fully conscious. His is not the mood of the blind enthusiast, nor that of the shallow dilettante. He is entirely serious and keenly cautious. There

¹ *The Life of Reason*. By George Santayana. Vols. I and II: *Reason in Common Sense*; *Reason in Society*. New York: Scribner. ix+291 and viii+205 pages. \$1.25 each.

² Vols. III and IV have already been issued; Vol. V is still in preparation.

is no writer of today who is more quick in perceiving, and more direct in laying bare false pretensions, blundering observations, groundless generalizations, or absurd analyses. His is a mind for nice distinctions, fine articulations, and strong, clean-cut expression. The keen criticism which characterizes the volumes throughout is not that of barren cynicism but the insistent demand of a marvelously well-informed mind which is precise and well-balanced in its own movement, and demands a similar breadth, balance, and precision on the part of all others who take upon themselves the responsibility of reading the characteristics of life, and consequently of furnishing the cues for its succeeding movements. Professor Santayana admits frankly that the attempt to formulate the movements of human life into a world-view, which at the same time must constitute a humanitarian method of conduct, would be absurd and impossible in the extreme were every philosopher to attempt the task entirely on his own resources and from the beginning. Fortunately, the investigator of life's processes and problems today may avail himself of the results of the labors accomplished by a large number of workers in the varied fields of science, and may have the perspective of his own insight determined by an intelligent appreciation of the insights won by those thinkers with whose labors the history of philosophy makes us acquainted. Of the results of scientific investigation Professor Santayana shows himself to be exceptionally well informed. Proof of the thoroughness of his assimilation of scientific methods and results is found alike in the *tone* which is so characteristic of his volumes and in the *point* which each sentence individually exhibits. That our author has clearly won the right to attempt a re-reading of the interpretations which have been made of the most abstract problems of human life and destiny is evidenced by the clean-cut and masterly expositions of the great philosophic classics introduced incidentally into the movement of his argument.

As one would expect from the virility and concreteness of his critical expositions, Professor Santayana is exceedingly trenchant in the presentation of his own point of view. Out of the turmoil and confusion, so characteristic of the complex intellectual life of our day, two complementary methods emerge. First, we may find our interest center in the fact that our common world is a stream of activities whose intimate characteristic is continuous flux. This discovery of Heraclitus has been made the starting-point of modern scientific insight and investigation. For, whatever else the world may be, to the scientist it is essentially dynamic—a world of change whose evanescent, concrete forms change with kaleidoscopic rapidity, yet exhibit in their change certain constant recurring

values. To examine these processes, to determine precisely their characteristics and constant principles of recurrence is the problem of science. Its solution leads from qualitative experience to quantitative measurement, from apparent spontaneity to the definiteness of fixed principles. Hence science must, inevitably, formulate its results in terms of quantitative mechanical conceptions. And yet, for the scientist, quantity and necessity are not things-in-themselves, but, rather, formulations of the constant conditions of the come and go of concrete processes, and, consequently, mere methods for the manipulation and control of the same. They are instruments and not entities. Second, interest may center in the fact that the world is an interconnected whole whose varied processes exhibit definite functions. If, now, we investigate from this point of view, we find that quantity is absorbed by quality, and necessity by spontaneity. Life as a value with determinate norms or standards presses in upon us; nature appears no longer to be dead, rigid, and mechanical, but a thing alive and glowing with enthusiasm for inspiring and effective ideals. As the processes of life gave the scientist an ever-deepening insight into its permanent conditions, so attention to their uses reveals to the inquirer ever richer, nobler, and more efficient standards of value and norms of conduct. For just as science gives us control over the processes of the world, so morality, art, and religion enable us to organize more complexly and efficiently the values to which the same nature gives rise. Ideals, also, are instruments and not entities.

Thus from both results we are led to a demand for a final synthesis. Realism and idealism are not contradictory but complementary. As scientists, we may insist upon reading nature in terms of necessary mechanical conditions; as appreciators of art, morality, and religion, we may insist upon reading nature in terms of free ideals. Each conception taken in itself is an abstraction. Both alike fall within that concrete movement by which, in its myriad individuals, humanity emerges from the matrix of nature, defines that nature to itself, and through this definition controls it and establishes its own identity in principle with its source. Hence, reality is defined through the movement of human life, and human life attains its proper insight when it realizes its dependence upon, and affinity with, reality. Science and appreciation are distinctively human and at the same time distinctively of nature. Only as nature fabricates humanity can either arise. The form each takes at any moment depends entirely upon the concrete problem which nature sets for human life. However, as life gains insight into the conditions of its own processes and into its proper methods of functioning, it bends nature to its will, stamping its

science and its appreciations as distinctively human, and nature in this as its recognized and affiliated source. Thus humanity is naturalized and nature humanized.

After this fashion Professor Santayana lays firm and deep the foundations of a marked and distinctive contribution to philosophy. Certain features of this contribution may bear renewed emphasis. The dualism between the mechanism of science, on the one hand, and the teleology of art, morality, and religion, on the other, is resolved. The relationship of the world to human ideals, is adjusted, without violence being done to either. Both the unity and the diversity of the interests of realism and idealism are found in the instrumental conditions and methods of human activity. Knowledge is exhibited as essentially humanistic and pragmatic. Finally, while he demonstrates that all knowledge is humanistic and pragmatic, Professor Santayana points out that in being human it is yet of nature, and because it is pragmatic, it is also affiliated with its own concrete ground. He thus avoids the danger of confusing his doctrine with Protagorean relativity, on the one hand, and with static, absolutistic idealism, on the other.

One cannot take leave of Professor Santayana without grateful recognition of the excellencies of his style and the marvelous lucidity and untechnical character of his language. Many difficulties present themselves to the reader in the course of the argument but they are difficulties of content and not of form, of the inherent complexity of the subject-matter and not of the exposition.

In taking up Professor Flint's³ book, one comes into a very different atmosphere. In the one case thought is free to seek and to find the norms of conduct in the great mart of life; in the latter it is "cribbed, cabined and confined" within the limits of evangelical orthodoxy. Behind all Professor Flint's endeavors at philosophizing, one sees the specters of theological assumptions in the background. Hence, while the volume doubtless has value for certain minds, it has comparatively little interest for the student of philosophy. The one serious endeavor at consecutive philosophic thinking is to be found in the opening chapter upon the general field and methods of philosophy. The distinctions and definitions here are, in general, trite, and should have been compressed into a very few pages instead of being diffused over sixty-three. The remainder of the book is a rambling account of a variety of historical endeavors at a classification of the sciences. One is almost tempted to feel that, having com-

³ *Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum and a History of the Classifications of the Sciences*. By Robert Flint. New York: Scribner. x+340 pages. \$4.50.

pleted his serious work, Professor Flint found that he had a variety of odds and ends of erudition left over which he put into the form of a book.

*The World as Intention*⁴ is also an endeavor to harmonize scientific methods and results with the preconceptions of conservative supernaturalism. While admitting that the methods and discoveries of science have turned the theological world upside down, Gratacap maintains that if we push scientific assumptions hard enough, we shall find that they can be forced back upon a supernaturalistic base from which the theologian may advance to the firm re-occupation of his earlier miraculous, authority-revelation positions. The volume is written in a serious, straight-forward manner, and is worthy of attention for this if for no other reason. Its results are, however, inconclusive, and serve best to illustrate the impossibility of synthesizing the methods and results of natural science with the methods and assumptions of traditional theology. The volume is an indication of the imperative necessity for religion to dig deeper than it has in the past and to rest its foundations in nature rather than in supernatural, if it would regain its lost hold upon men of scientific training.

The volume of Dr. Fors⁵ illustrates the truth that the conception which was once so universal, of mythologies as mere works of the imagination, æsthetic or otherwise, has given way before the investigations of comparative literature and anthropology. Nowadays we see in the myth the embodiment of the unreflective conceptions of man concerning his world and himself. When to myth are added ritual and magic, we have before us the three factors in custom, and in custom we have the record of the prehistoric life of peoples from a very remote past. What history is to civilization, that custom is to barbaric and more primitive times. And as barbarism and savagery underlie civilization, so custom underlies history. Important in this respect, both for the understanding of civilization in its larger sweep, and European civilization in particular, is the mythology of the Norse peoples. The work of Dr. Fors is valuable to the English student in that it brings him into touch with original sources and authoritative references, and, moreover, furnishes a very clear and readable outline of the predominant characteristic of Norse mythology—its ethical stamp. This essentially practical aspect the author finds to be the reflex of the life of the people, whose circumstances placed them in a hard environment both physical and social, and which of necessity generated in them those

⁴ *The World as Intention*. By L. P. Gratacap. Boston: Eaton & Mains. viii + 346 pages. \$1.25.

⁵ *The Ethical World-Conception of the Norse People*. By A. P. Fors. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 57 pages. \$0.50.

habits of courage, independence, love of liberty and fair play which had so large a part in originating the representative institutions of Anglo-Saxon peoples.

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In his *Transitional Eras in Thought*⁶ Professor Armstrong has applied the conception of "growth and decay" to those periods in the history of thought when the mind pauses, critically reviews the way traversed, doubts the value of results attained, and then, rising from its despondency, presses on to new achievements. He carefully analyzes, as typical eras, the period of the Sophists and of the Skeptics in Greece, and the eighteenth century in western Europe, points out their similar and dissimilar elements, and then presents the commingled threads of thought and feeling in the present age which he regards as transitional.

The crest of the negative wave in modern thought he thinks is past, and insists that the reconstruction already begun should conform to the one method, or process, by which such eras have been terminated in the past, viz., "the process of synthetic development," which is but the correlation of results attained in the manner "characteristic of all thinking in its higher reaches." He subscribes to the so-called "faith-philosophy," but is careful to indicate that *faith* is nearest *belief*, which psychologically "is an attitude of mind with reference to conscious contents."

The feeling one gets, while reading the book, that the present age, viewed constructively, is but a period in which to take account of stock, and that consequently there is danger of arrested development, is offset by the author's insistence that it is "better, far better, to grope in mental darkness, better to abandon any cherished conviction, no matter how bereft its loss may leave the soul, than to depart from the central principle of intellectual integrity." He is not a peace-at-any-price advocate. At times, too, one feels that he has not analyzed far enough, that he has not seen certain objections and suggestions that might be made; but later in the discussion enough comes to light to indicate that the author had these matters clearly in mind, so that eventually one feels the thoroughness of the work.

On the whole, Professor Armstrong has viewed his problem from many sides, and the wealth of historical, scientific, sociological, and philosophical knowledge he displays, together with his maturity and sanity of thought, leaves little to be desired in his solution.

⁶ *Transitional Eras in Thought*. By A. C. Armstrong. New York: Macmillan, 1904. 347 pages.

In his *Social Law in the Spiritual World*⁷ Professor Jones has given some interesting "studies in human and divine interrelationship." He has not sought to develop a "metaphysical treatise," but "to help earnest and perplexed seekers to find a good working conception of God and man's relation to him." He has attempted "to show through psychology," as Drummond showed through biology, "that life can be unified from top to bottom." His philosophical bias is neo-Hegelianism mediated by John and Edward Caird, "who helped him more than any other British thinkers of recent times." He also acknowledges his indebtedness to Palmer, Royce, James, and Baldwin.

Personality is his central theme. This "is not a primitive possession," but "is made through ideals." "*At every stage it involves interrelation.* . . . To be a person means to be a conscious member of a social order. . . . Individuality does not come first and society next as a product. Society is fundamental, and it is an essential condition for self-consciousness and personality."

But if man's "*personal life is conjunct*," that fact "must have profound religious significance. If man cannot be a self alone, no more can God." Thus he passes easily to the "inward side" of "all personal religion," which he illustrates from the mystics and Quakers. The "negation mystics," as he terms them, tend to reduce their consciousness to zero, but the "affirmation mystics" consider that "obedience to vision is more important than vision itself. . . . Error is to be attacked and truth is to be advanced. . . . Those who would have a closer view of the divine must seek it in a life of love and sacrifice." To this latter class he maintains that the Quakers belong. Their true principle is based on "primitive experience. Men found God in their lives." Their formulation of that experience "must hold that God is the inward principle and ground of the personal life. . . . To become spiritual is to become a divine-human person."

The test of spiritual guidance, the real Reformation principle, and always prominent among the Quakers, he regards as the crux, which, however, he resolves by asserting that a man "*must test*" his own inner promptings "by the spiritual life in other men." "All truth is put to a social test," and this can be no exception.

His discussion of "faith," still in close harmony with his central theme, is especially good. "To be a person means to act for ends which we believe are good, to live under the sway of an ideal. . . . But this kind

⁷ *Social Law in the Spiritual World*. By Rufus M. Jones. Philadelphia: Winston, 1904. 272 pages. \$1.25.

of life is never for a minute possible without faith," which, as he finally defines it, is "the will to act as though we knew, for the sake of an end which we seek. . . . It begins with a trust in the goodness which is dimly shadowed forth in the world we see," but which ultimately "begins to show its actuality *in us*. . . . On its higher side, therefore, it is an actual appropriation of the Divine Life, a positive realization of spiritual goodness, which steadily moves toward a conscious relationship of the soul to God." In him we come to live, move, and have our being.

In his final discussion of the "divine-human life," in connection with which he cites many New Testament passages, he makes a very significant statement, wholly in line with the central thought of the book, and apparently in harmony with his quotations, viz.: "The goal which the gospel presents is the attainment of no far-away heaven—not admission at the gate of some jeweled city in the sky. It is the reproduction of this type of the divine-human life which Christ manifested."

If, in the face of the author's fine spirit, and of the many exceptionally valuable thoughts and suggestions which he presents, one were to criticise, such criticism would be directed against the apparent tendency toward hypostatization, the failure to define "spiritual" precisely and consistently, unless the vagueness were intended—sometimes it is used as coextensive with one's total inner life, and sometimes as a God-imparted life—and the constant use of the term "feeling" where the "interpretation of one's feeling" would seem to be more appropriate. Strictly speaking, one does not feel God present. One interprets one's feelings as evidence of God's presence.

The book in its entirety shows that Professor Jones is wholly in sympathy with the so-called theanthropic type of religion, rather than with the theocratic, and at the same time illustrates President Schurman's remark, that at present there is taking place "a change from the dogmatic religion of Christendom to the spiritual religion of Christ."

This author,⁸ as his preface indicates, had access to the best sources for a study of Descartes and Spinoza. His treatment is biographical and expository, though the critical is not neglected.

After a just characterization of the period preceding the New Philosophy, he gives Descartes' life, and then develops his system with frequent quotations. He treats both sides of his dualism in detail, and shows how necessary the conception of God was. "The proof of the existence of God," he maintains, "is the essential principle of the Cartesian philosophy."

⁸ *Descartes and Spinoza*. By J. Iverach. ["The World's Epoch-Makers."] New York: Scribner, 1904. 245 pages. \$1.25.

He regards Descartes as the "man who embodied the spirit of the age." "He set the world a-thinking, and the answers to his questions form the history of modern philosophy."

He emphasizes the fact that Spinoza was a Hebrew. Early training and tradition unconsciously influenced his view of the world. His dependence upon Descartes at first, and later divergence from him, are traced with a firm hand. "Causation is the fundamental concept of his philosophy," but "he never lost sight of the practical, ethical end—to form man to a perfect character." In his "*Ethics* his philosophy assumed its final form." "His system, except in the parts which deal with the emotions, cannot be said to be an interpretation of experience," which in the last analysis "a system of philosophy ought to be," but, "after all drawbacks, Spinoza must be reckoned among the great thinkers of humanity."

The book is a fresh, independent interpretation of Descartes and Spinoza, readable, and one that whets the appetite for a more extended study.

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TESTIMONY FROM SCIENCE AND FROM PHILOSOPHY CONCERNING THE FUTURE LIFE

It is quite unnecessary to enlarge upon the interest that belongs to the subject of a future life. Couple with the evanescence and uncertainty of our present life the transcendent and far-reaching character of human ideals, and we shall be less surprised at the rather remarkable fact that, in spite of the silence of those who have passed beyond our ken, in spite of the fact that no traveler has returned to tell the story of that other land, the belief in human immortality retains its hold upon the minds of men; and no stone is left unturned to prove what we already believe, or at least hope for.

In the two small volumes before us the question is approached from quite opposite standpoints. In the one, some *proof* of a *scientific* sort is sought for the existence of discarnate spirits; and philosophy is declared to be "helpless and worthless for proving a future life." In the other, the whole argument for immortality is philosophical in its character, even to the extent of denying the ability of science to give us a knowledge of the ultimate meaning of things.

Science, Professor Münsterberg¹ reminds us, deals with the realm of

¹ *The Eternal Life*. By Hugo Münsterberg. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1905. 72 pages. \$0.85.